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The Law of ‘Never Again’: Transitional
Justice and the Transformation of the Norm of
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A B S T R A C T1
This article analyses the transformation of guarantees of non-recurrence (GNRs), the
least developed pillar of transitional justice (TJ), and sets a legal and conceptual foun-
dation of the norm for TJ theory and practice. It draws out key characteristics of
GNRs including the norm’s various contents and contexts, stressing its exceptional fu-
ture-oriented nature in international law. The article investigates conceptual origins of
preventing non-recurrence in the early developments of TJ and the recent normative
expansions undertaken by the UN Special Rapporteur. The main contributions of the
article are establishing GNRs as normatively distinct in TJ and identifying transfers of
local-level advocacy from Latin America to general norm creation. Finally, the article
proposes a tension between decontextualizing the norm content to make it universally
applicable and recent attempts to normatively expand the norm and improve its con-
text-specificity, and discusses its potential consequences for TJ practice.
K E Y W O R D S : Guarantees of non-recurrence, international law, ‘Never Again,’ norm
transformation
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Ensuring non-recurrence of violations of international law is a norm with a most
curious journey. First used to solve diplomatic disputes, in more recent years guaran-
tees of non-recurrence/non-repetition (GNRs) were codified as aspects of state re-
sponsibility for internationally wrongful acts, a form of reparations for international
human rights law (IHRL) and humanitarian law violations and a right of states as
well as individual actors. In 2011, when the office of the UN Special Rapporteur for
the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence (here-
after: Special Rapporteur) was created, the four pillars of the field of transitional just-
ice (TJ) were confirmed. Subsequently, the central goal of preventing future
repetitions of violence in TJ, also known as the ‘Never Again’ promise, is now
phrased as GNRs and separated from reparations, contrary to IHRL.
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Although the norm of non-recurrence has been fragmented across different nor-
mative regimes, transitional justice has shown little interest in the conceptual history
of GNRs and their accommodation in international law. Instead, in the words of
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, GNRs have become ‘something of a catch-all category.’1 While
ensuring non-repetition is an agreed-upon objective of TJ practice,2 much ambiguity
emerges when scholars undertake the task of positioning GNRs within broader TJ
theory. GNRs are typically praised as the forward-looking pillar of TJ, which sits well
with the ‘two-way’ gaze of the field whereby transitional justice is both backward-
and forward-looking in a linear fashion; it deals with the past in order to ensure a
peaceful future.3 It is also, as I will demonstrate in this article, a characteristic bor-
rowed from international law. Being forward-looking, GNRs have been attached to
the ideas of transformative TJ.4 By way of example, Garcia-Godos suggests that guar-
antees of non-repetition have the potential to enhance structural transformations
postconflict, as they concern institutional reform at large.5 Mayer-Rieckh, on the
other hand, puts forward an argument that GNRs conceptually bridge the two grand
tasks of transitional justice – repairing for past violations and ensuring a peaceful fu-
ture – rather than being solely a forward-looking element.6
Although there are notable engagements with GNRs in the literature,7 most
authors who have written about GNRs thus far are aware of the lack of empirical sub-
stance to support any claims regarding the transformative traits of these guarantees
or that the suggested measures at all lead to non-recurrence. Such a situation arises
both from the underconceptualization of GNRs in TJ, as well as from the overall lack
of theorizing within the field. As a result, Sandoval-Villalba observes that GNRs ‘re-
main the missing piece of the transitional justice puzzle,’8 Mayer-Rieckh notes that
GNRs are understudied in transitional justice literature9 and Garcia-Godos sees
GNRs as insufficiently explored, both empirically and conceptually.10 Most recently,
in his editorial note in this journal, Pablo de Greiff has declared GNRs to be, at least
doctrinally, ‘the least developed element of transitional justice.’11
1 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Measures of Non-Repetition in Transitional Justice: The Missing Link?’ in From
Transitional to Transformative Justice, ed. Simon Robins and Paul Gready (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019), 124.
2 For instance, M. Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe, ‘Exploring/Expanding the Reach of Transitional
Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 11 (2017): 371–377.
3 Lynn Davies, ‘Justice-sensitive Education: The Implications of Transitional Justice Mechanisms for
Teaching and Learning,’ Comparative Education 53 (2017): 333–350.
4 Clara Sandoval-Villalba, ‘Reflections on the Transformative Potential of Transitional Justice and the
Nature of Social Change in Times of Transition,’ in Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice
in Fractured Societies, ed. Roger Duthie and Paul Seils (New York: International Center for Transitional
Justice, 2017), 5.
5 Jemima Garcia-Godos, ‘Reparation,’ in An Introduction to Transitional Justice, ed. Olivera Simic (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2017), 177–200.
6 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, ‘Guarantees of Non-Recurrence: An Approximation,’ Human Rights Quarterly 39
(2017): 416–448.
7 Most prominently, Roht-Arriaza, supra n 1 and Mayer-Rieckh, supra n 6.
8 Sandoval-Villalba, supra n 4.
9 Mayer-Rieckh, supra n 6 at 417.
10 Garcia-Godos, supra n 5.
11 Pablo de Greiff, ‘The Future of the Past: Reflections on the Present State and Prospects of Transitional
Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 14 (2020): 251–259.
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In this article, I respond to the identified gaps about GNRs in TJ scholarship and
aim to provide a conceptual foundation for the norm of non-recurrence in TJ. I trace
the development of GNRs from the early examples of inter-state disputes and public
international law (PIL) to non-recurrence as victims’ rights in IHRL and finally, early
transitional justice. Throughout these sections, I stress the competing understandings
of GNRs across legal regimes and in TJ and observe that, although states have been
reluctant to seek specific GNRs before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), UN
agencies and most notably transitional justice scholars and actors have taken up the
task of affirming GNRs as a norm with differentiating non-exceptional and content-
specific characteristics. These multiple actors have been very progressive in develop-
ing GNRs, demonstrating a shift towards an expanded scope of both the right and
obligation to guarantee non-repetition of violations. Most importantly, I argue that it
is TJ that inspired the content/contextual expansion of GNRs in international
human rights law and not vice versa, therein substantially transforming the previously
ambiguous and exceptional norm into a set of measures of legal and institutional
reform.
Several key questions about GNRs in transitional justice are answered in this art-
icle. First, what is, as Pablo de Greiff phrases it, ‘the offer’:12 what content does a
guarantee of non-recurrence entail across legal regimes and in TJ? Second, how did
GNRs secure their position as one of the pillars of TJ? Third, what is the relevance
of GNRs’ legal origins and the developed conceptual mismatches and overlaps for TJ
practice? The article makes three core contributions to TJ literature. Firstly, it does
so by discovering the influence of the transitional Latin American experience, most
notably Chile, on the transformation of the norm of non-recurrence in IHRL.
Secondly, it accounts for GNRs as becoming normatively different in transitional
justice than in PIL and IHRL and explores the relevance of this distinction in inter-
national TJ advocacy and practice. Lastly, it opens a conversation about norm revolu-
tion, or rather confusion, of GNRs in and by transitional justice, and the potential
effects on future practices. The article starts with a review of GNRs in PIL, followed
by an overview of the transformation of GNRs in IHRL. These sections remain ra-
ther brief and only capture the main developments regarding GNRs in the two legal
regimes. The article then shifts its focus back to transitional justice, where I examine
the conceptual origins of equating non-recurrence to measures of institutional re-
form, and further trace the transformations of the norm undertaken by the Special
Rapporteur. Finally, I discuss the consequences of decontextualized norm transform-
ation and attempts to recontextualize it in TJ practice and call for further empirical
studies of GNRs.
S T A T E R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y T O E N S U R E N O N - R E P E T I T I O N
The recorded story of GNRs began nearly three centuries before that of transitional
justice. Since then, GNRs have developed as a norm of exceptional character in PIL.
Numerous examples of past diplomatic practice point to a wide acceptance of injured
states’ right to demand these guarantees, suggesting, by way of a customary norm,
12 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of
Non-Recurrence,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/30/42 (2015), 7.
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that assurances and GNRs could be a legal consequence of an internationally wrong-
ful act.13 One of the earliest documented practices takes us back to 1707, when the
Russian Ambassador to the newly created United Kingdom, Andrey Matveyev, was
arrested by his creditors, mishandled and placed in prison. This was done according
to the English law that at the time did not offer protection to aliens from imprison-
ment for debt.14 After Matveyev’s angry departure from England, an Act of
Parliament called the Diplomatic Privileges Act was adopted in 1708 to prevent the
recurrence of such incidents in which foreign ambassadors could be physically
injured.15 The Diplomatic Privileges Act is a less common example of the injuring
state practising its obligation of conduct through the adoption of specific measures or
actions. Besides new legislation, other such specific measures of non-recurrence
taken to solve inter-state disputes included apologies and instructing the injuring
state’s agents to act in specific, improved ways.16
Most commonly, however, states demanded assurances – as opposed to guaran-
tees – of non-repetition: that is, expression of mere moral commitment to non-recur-
rence. By way of example, in the 1904 Dogger Bank incident, the UK requested that
Russia provided ‘security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents.’17 The
legal obligation was that of result, and the sole absence of repetition of the same
event against the same state would suffice. This line of state practice thereby shows
that although the idea of legislative reforms as a possible guarantee of non-recurrence
existed and subsequently persisted, the specific content of GNRs was predominantly
absent.
Two main sources that codify GNR in PIL are the ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand
case18 and the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts19 (ARSIWA). Both were issued as recently
as 2001. The LaGrand case concerned alleged breaches of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, which the US committed by failing to inform
two foreign detainees, the German nationals and brothers LaGrand, of their rights
before sentencing them to death and executing them. Germany requested a guaran-
tee that the opposing party would not repeat these violations in the future and would
ensure that both its domestic law and practices allowed for an effective exercise of
the rights included in the Convention. Germany’s request signals that it would not
have been satisfied with the more common verbal assurance of non-repetition or a
13 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Second Report on State Responsibility,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/425 & Add. 1 &
Corr. 1. (International Law Commission Yearbook, 1989) vol. II(1).
14 See J. Dumas, ‘La responsabilite des Etats a raison des crimes et delits commis sur leur territoire au preju-
dice d’etrangers,’ Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye 36 (1931), quoted in
Arangio-Ruiz., ibid., para 159.
15 Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, available at Statutes Project at http://statutes.org.uk/site/the-statutes/
eighteenth-century/1708-7-anne-c-12-diplomatic-privileges-act/ (accessed 17 July 2020).
16 Arangio-Ruiz, supra n 13 at para 158; Scott M. Sullivan, ‘Changing the Premise of International Legal
Remedies: The Unfounded Adoption of Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition,’ UCLA Journal of
International Law and Foreign Affairs 7 (2002): 265–231.
17 Arangio-Ruiz, supra n 13 at para 155.
18 LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), 104, I.C.J. 2001 [466].
19 International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,’ adopted at
the 53rd session (2001), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001) vol. II (2).
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symbolic apology. Instead, Germany concluded that more was needed and that more
meant specific GNRs, concrete steps that would prevent the automatic reproduction
of violations of the Vienna Convention. In addition to recognizing general GNRs
such as apologies, the ICJ acknowledged the existence of specific guarantees that
would trigger amendments in laws or policies;20 nevertheless, it did not go further in
explaining what particular steps the US would need to take to comply with such an
order, leaving the whole concept somewhat ambiguous.21 Therefore, the choice of
the form that GNRs take was left to the injuring state.22
Observing the more recent cases together with LaGrand,23 there seems to be an
agreement at the ICJ that assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are a possible,
but not a necessary consequence of committing an internationally wrongful act for
the injuring state, and that the injured state might be entitled to seek both general
and specific guarantees that the breach will not be repeated. The LaGrand case also
implies that GNRs are qualitatively distinct from other traditional types of repara-
tions which states seek to restore the status quo; GNRs, on the contrary, are ‘for-
ward-looking,’ and invested in the prevention of future violations by changing – and
not restoring – the status quo.24
In the drafting history of the ARSIWA, the idea of state responsibility to prevent
the repetition of injurious acts was present from the early stages. Already in 1961,
F.V. Garcia-Amador, an independent expert hired by the ILC, included measures to
prevent repetition in Article 27 of his draft Articles on state responsibility for injuries
caused to aliens.25 All subsequent independent experts followed Garcia-Amador’s
ideas in their recommendations about non-repetition. Still, James Crawford, who was
one of the drafters, admitted that GNRs were one of the most debated provisions be-
fore the adoption of ARSIWA.26 A reading of the Drafting Committee’s meetings
exhibits significant hesitations about GNRs and their foundation in law.27 More pre-
cisely, debates arose about whether assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
should be treated as a form of satisfaction, as a separate form of reparation or as
being unrelated to reparation stricto sensu.28
20 LaGrand, supra n 18 at [514].
21 Christian J. Tams, ‘Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: LaGrand and the Law of
State Responsibility,’ Yale Journal of International Law 27 (2002): 441–444.
22 Sandrine Barbier, ‘Assurance and Guarantees of Non-Repetition,’ in The Law of International
Responsibility, ed. James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (New York: Oxford University Press
2010), 560.
23 See, for example, Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), 303, I.C.J., 2002 [318]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia), 43, I.C.J., 2007 [466]; Dispute
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 50, I.C.J., 2009 [150].
24 Tams, supra n 21.
25 F.V. Garcia-Amador, ‘International Responsibility: Sixth Report,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/134 (26 January
1961).
26 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014),
470.
27 Barbier, supra n 22.
28 Yann Kerbrat, ‘Interactions between the Forms of Reparation,’ in The Law of International Responsibility,
ed. James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 573–
587.
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In the final version of the ARSIWA of 2001, a state responsible for an inter-
nationally wrongful act has an obligation to not only cease the act but, under
Article 30(b), to ‘offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if
circumstances so require.’ The very last clause of that Article, previously changed
from ‘when appropriate,’ indicates, as the minutes of the Drafting Committee
show, that GNRs are not a necessary legal consequence of any breach of inter-
national law.29 Hence, the provision on GNRs was drafted with flexibility in order
to, according to the commentary, ‘prevent the kinds of abusive and excessive
claims’ of GNRs certain states made ‘in the past.’30 Whether assurances and GNRs
will be awarded depends on the circumstances of the case, including the nature of
the breach and the obligation. Despite previous classifications of GNRs as a form
of satisfaction or a separate type of reparation, the final version of the ARSIWA
defines them as neither. Namely, Article 34 delineates different forms of reparation
as restitution, compensation and satisfaction – to be applied individually or in com-
bination – but does not include GNRs under satisfaction. In the commentary, how-
ever, the ILC stated it did not make an exhaustive list of measures of satisfaction,
and that GNRs could take the form of satisfaction, giving the example of repealing
the legislation which brought about the violation in question as both a GNR and
measure of satisfaction.31 The overarching explanation for such a decision was that
international practice has not been univocal when it comes to the content of
GNRs. Nevertheless, placing GNRs within Article 30 implies norm autonomy due
to their future-looking focus on prevention.
What both the ICJ’s case law and the ARSIWA establish is that GNRs are excep-
tional; they are not a necessary consequence of a breach of international law and are
flexible in content. The fact that neither the ARSIWA nor the ICJ’s jurisprudence so
far tells us much about specific guarantees can be interpreted as purposeful and in
line with the non-uniform state practice. Most importantly for the future develop-
ments of GNRs in transitional justice, in PIL they are not only exceptional in their
triggering of state obligation but also their nature; they are construed as qualitatively
different, ‘forward-looking,’ progressive and preventive.
G U A R A N T E E S O F N O N - R E C U R R E N C E A S A V I C T I M ’ S R I G H T
Thus far, this article establishes the relevance and exceptional application of GNRs
for states, should they breach an international obligation they have towards another
state or the international community. However, guaranteeing non-recurrence has, as
a legal concept, gained much more prominence in international human rights law, a
regime geared towards individuals, which has expanded the content, context and
state obligation to ensure non-recurrence. Experts in this regime drew from the
ARSIWA to fortify their claims about state responsibility to ensure non-repetition of
violations, despite the distinct nature of such violations. In the UN Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
29 ‘Summary Record of the 2701st Meeting,’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2701, extracted from the Yearbook of
the International Law Commission (2001) vol. I, para 65.
30 International Law Commission, supra n 19 at 91.
31 Ibid.
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Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter the Basic Principles),32 GNRs have
been conceptualized as a right of the victim.33 The position GNRs occupy in this
document largely stems from the work done by Theo van Boven and M. Cherif
Bassiouni, two experts who were mandated by the UN to conduct studies on the
right to remedy. Van Boven’s first comprehensive set of principles was issued in
1993 and went through minor changes in the subsequent years, eventually differenti-
ating between five forms of reparation: cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfac-
tion and GNRs.34 How did GNRs, previously treated as a right of an injured state
and distinct from reparations, end up there?
That victims of human rights violations were entitled to an effective remedy
was already cemented in several human rights documents predating van Boven’s
principles, such as Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well
as Article 2(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Additionally, regional human rights conventions have their own provisions pro-
tecting this right,35 and van Boven used all of these sources to fortify his drafts.
Since none of these documents mention GNRs in any form, a likely explanation
for their inclusion lies in van Boven’s references to the work of the ILC on the
ARSIWA which was, at that point, still in progress. Admitting that the ILC’s draft
articles are suited for inter-state disputes, he nevertheless found particularly useful
the ILC’s identification of different types of reparations.36 For van Boven, how-
ever, GNRs and measures of satisfaction are one and the same, both enshrined in
Article 11.
Most notably, van Boven drafted several specific measures that could be applied to
meet the goal of preventing the recurrence of violations. This was the first time
GNRs were specified as concrete measures in a UN document and exactly what the
ILC shied away from doing. Bassiouni’s 2000 draft articles on satisfaction and guar-
antees of non-repetition, faithful to van Boven’s definition, expanded previous guide-
lines by adding two entirely new principles of GNRs without citing any sources of
these ideas in the commentary. In this new draft, it was acknowledged that the prin-
ciples incorporate some emerging norms and standards and aspire to anticipate fu-
ture developments in international law.37 For these reasons, a linguistic distinction
32 ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law,’ UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2005).
33 Although they concern violations of both human rights law and humanitarian law, for this article, the
Basic Principles are categorized under the former considering that GNRs have not yet developed in the
latter.
34 See Theo van Boven, ‘Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1993/8 (2 July 1993).
35 Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 25 of the American Convention
on Human Rights and Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
36 Van Boven, supra n 34.
37 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (18
January 2000), para 9.






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab011/6304982 by guest on 23 August 2021
was made to reflect existing international obligations (‘states shall’) in contrast to
emerging norms (‘states should’).38 GNRs fall under the latter category, which sug-
gests they were not a fully conceptualized international obligation at the time in this
legal regime.
During this period, GNRs also made appearances in other IHRL developments,
emerging as a set of measures to reform state laws and institutions. Notably, when
Louis Joinet drafted the principles on combatting impunity in 1997, he recom-
mended a set of measures preventing victims from enduring new violations. Joinet
included three broad categories of legal and institutional reform for non-recurrence,
which were separate from the right to reparation: the disbandment of paramilitary
groups; the repeal of emergency legislation and recognition of the inviolability and
non-derogability of habeas corpus; and removal from office of senior state officials
implicated in serious human rights violations.39 Diane Orentlicher was later hired to
update these principles ‘to reflect recent developments in international law’ which
resulted in a report published in February 2005.40 In her report, Orentlicher has
regrouped reparation and GNRs together since ‘human rights treaty bodies have
often treated GNRs as a component of reparations,’ including the then-most recent
draft on the Basic Principles.41 Institutional reform included under general principles
of GNRs, according to Orentlicher’s draft, should advance the objectives of consist-
ent adherence by public institutions to the rule of law, repeal of legislation that con-
tributes or authorizes violations of human rights and/or humanitarian law, civil
control of military and security forces and intelligence services and disbandment of
parastatal armed forces and, finally and distinctly, reintegration into society of chil-
dren involved in armed conflict.42
Several months after these impunity principles were updated, the Basic Principles
were finalized. In this revised set of principles, GNRs, surprisingly and, I note, con-
trary to van Boven’s and Bassiouni’s drafts, appeared as a self-standing measure of ef-
fective reparation, along with restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and
satisfaction, confirming Orentlicher’s classification. This final conceptualization runs
contrary to the ARSIWA where GNRs are deliberately separate from reparations as
they ‘look to the protection or maintenance of the legal relationship’ and are, in that
sense, presupposing a risk of recurrence.43
Considering the importance of the Basic Principles in later TJ practices, it is
worthwhile listing all the included measures of GNRs. Specifically, under Article 23
of the Basic Principles, GNRs should include, ‘where applicable, any or all of the fol-
lowing measures’:
38 Ibid., para 8.
39 Louis Joinet, ‘The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees. Revised Final Report
Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1997/20/Rev.1 (2 October 1997), principles 37–42.
40 Diane Orentlicher, ‘Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat
Impunity,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (18 February 2005), 4.
41 Ibid, n 76.
42 Ibid.
43 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law. 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 89.
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1. Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
2. Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international
standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
3. Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
4. Protecting persons in the legal, medical and healthcare professions, the
media and other related professions and human rights defenders;
5. Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international
humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law en-
forcement officials as well as military and security forces;
6. Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in par-
ticular international standards, by public servants, including law enforce-
ment, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service and military
personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
7. Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and
their resolution;
8. Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations
of international human rights law and serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law.44
Although in their content the final Basic Principles contained only minor depar-
tures from Bassiouni’s 2000 guidelines, their novel positioning as a standalone form
of reparations points to further norm autonomy. The listed measures, as demon-
strated, largely focus on laws, institutions and state officials. To ensure non-repetition
of human rights violations, therefore, by and large means to reform the state and its
institutions. Bassiouni’s commentary from 2006 suggests that for each of these meas-
ures the drafters took into consideration previous decisions and recommendations
by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), in addition to UN General Assembly Resolutions.45
The Basic Principles are a crucial development in the story of GNRs in TJ. The
principles provide this previously purposefully ambiguous and flexible norm with a
number of specific measures that a state found in breach of human rights and hu-
manitarian law might have an obligation to provide. This document challenges and
expands not only state obligation but also the contents and contexts of GNRs.
Reparations are usually meant to make amends to the victim(s); however, including
GNRs suggests that they, through legal and institutional reforms, are meant to bene-
fit the entire affected community. As far as contexts are concerned, GNRs previously
applied in cases of typically individual breaches in interstate relations but have now
become operational in the context of gross violations of international human rights
(and humanitarian) law. The nature and gravity of such violations imply background
circumstances of war, civil conflict or state oppression. This implication has been
reflected in practice. By way of example, in the Ugandan peace agreement between
the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army, GNRs are referred to as a measure
44 Basic Principles, supra n 32.
45 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights,’ Human Rights Law Review 6 (2006):
203–279.
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of reparations in accordance with the Basic Principles.46 The principles, therefore,
make GNRs well-suited for the contexts of transitional justice. In the following sec-
tion, I argue that rather than the Basic Principles influencing the incorporation of
GNRs in TJ, it was TJ that inspired the content/contextual expansion of GNRs in
the Basic Principles and IHRL.
T R A N S I T I O N A L J U S T I C E A N D ‘ N E V E R A G A I N ’
On the GNRs timeline, it might be reasonable to assume that transitional justice
comes into the picture after the LaGrand judgment, the ARSIWA and the Basic
Principles, if for no other reason than the relatively short existence of the field.
Nevertheless, this would be a false assumption, although it is important here to sep-
arate the legal term ‘guarantees of non-recurrence’ from the core values attached to
GNRs in international law, that is, forward-looking measures that would prevent
repetition. These core values were noted in the early developments of TJ (or ‘justice
in transition’ at that time), which were shaped by the transitions from oppressive
regimes across Latin America where the promise that violations will not be repeated
enjoyed a prominent position. Notably, Argentina’s National Commission on
Disappeared People published a report entitled ‘Nunca Más = Never Again’ in 1984.
At that time, the ‘Never Again’ phrase was associated with the advocacy carried out
by human rights organizations and exiled groups to recognize the crimes perpetrated
by the dictatorship.47 In Argentina, as Crenzel reports, the phrase ‘Never Again’ itself
became linked to the demands for not only truth but also (criminal) justice.48 The
Nunca Más report gained further importance for the public once it was offered and
accepted as court evidence in the 1985 trials of military juntas. The truth commission
model and its attachment to ‘Never Again’ was subsequently exported to various
countries in Latin America (e.g., Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador). These develop-
ments shaped the emerging intervention of ‘justice in transition’ in Latin America,
whose ultimate goal, whether through a truth commission or criminal trials, became
to never experience such grave violations again.
It is in these developments, in Argentina and other mainly but not exclusively
Latin American countries transitioning from authoritarian regimes to democracy in
the 1980s, that Paige Arthur traces the conceptual origins of the field of TJ.49
Arthur’s arguments about the birth of TJ as a field distinct from human rights are
crucial for understanding the travels and transformations of GNRs. Her study focuses
on multiple actors who participated in the creation of TJ as a distinct and necessary
response to transitions to democracy, providing an ‘intellectual framework’ for it.50
Already at one of the first conferences on the topic of justice in transition, Jose
Zalaquett, a Chilean lawyer and later a commissioner on the Chilean National
46 ‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda
and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement,’ UN Doc. S/2007/435 (29 June 2007).
47 Emilio Crenzel, ‘Genesis, Uses, and Significations of the Nunca Más Report in Argentina,’ Latin American
Perspectives 42 (2015): 20–38.
48 Ibid.
49 Paige Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional
Justice,’ Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 321–367.
50 Ibid., 327.
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Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (TRC), began to advocate that concrete
measures such as state security reform should be undertaken for the reasons of ‘guar-
anteeing to victims that violations would not be repeated.’51 This is the language that
at that time had only been voiced by the activists in Latin America (‘Nunca Más’)
and the Human Rights Committee (‘ensuring that violations are not repeated’).
Until then, as I demonstrated in previous sections, the language of guaranteeing non-
repetition was reserved for interstate disputes, by and large practised as a right of
states and not state subjects. Prioritizing legal and institutional reform, including se-
curity sector reforms Zalaquett talked about, was characteristic of the transfers of
local-level advocacy against impunity to the international level as this process was
marked by an overall focus on the political change (to democracy) rather than, for
instance, social justice.52 In Eastern Europe at that time, reforming and controlling
the security sector by the new regimes became integral to the desired democratic
and economic transformations of countries in transition. In broader international
politics, ‘good institutions’ and ‘good governance’ emerged as most sought-after val-
ues in aid-receiving, developing states, defining how successes of state- and peace-
building, and therefore sustainable peace, are measured.53 While shaping the field’s
conceptual boundaries, the promoted measures in Latin America, well-placed within
the global end-of-the-Cold-War context, gave normative content to the principle of
‘Never Again’ that was then formulated as an objective of the emerging field of tran-
sitional justice.
In 1990, around the time the conferences were taking place, Zalaquett published
a seminal piece on confronting human rights violations.54 This article was seminal
for its influence on the setting of the intellectual framework for TJ, as noted by
Arthur, but also for feeding content into the norm of non-recurrence in both TJ and
IHRL, which has been omitted by TJ scholarship thus far. In the article, Zalaquett
outlines nearly all of the measures today known as GNRs before any of the human
rights documents mentioned in previous sections were drafted. He then saw ‘dealing
with transitional political situations’ as ‘a new area of human rights practice.’55 Due
to the myriad (at the time) unanswered questions such as what international legal
responsibilities governments have regarding past human rights violations, Zalaquett
found existing efforts ‘inadequate.’56 He, in turn, aspired to design a policy that
would more appropriately deal with past human rights violations.
Such a policy would have two general objectives: ‘to prevent the recurrence of
such abuses; and . . . repair the damage they have caused.’57 Here we see a clear sep-
aration between reparations and non-recurrence, a topic that caused a great deal of
disagreement among the ARSIWA drafters in the subsequent decade. In addition to
51 Ibid., 358.
52 Ibid.
53 Padraig McAullife, Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 26–28.
54 Jose Zalaquett, ‘Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Applicable
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measures of reparation, punishment and clemency, Zalaquett gave great weight to
preventive measures of non-repetition using examples of domestic practices in
Guatemala, the Philippines, Spain and Panama. Admitting that ‘there exists no single
formula’ for how best to prevent human rights violations, Zalaquett outlined the fol-
lowing ‘new’ measures of state, institutional and legal reforms. Firstly, he spoke of re-
inforcement of the legal system’s protection of human rights (e.g., amending
constitutions and ratifying human rights treaties) and secondly, of reforming/
strengthening institutions to reinforce the protection of human rights (judicial re-
form, human rights education and dismantling of intelligence services or other units
responsible for abuses).58
In the year after the article was published, Zalaquett sat on the Chilean TRC. The
commission’s lengthy final report includes a set of recommendations regarding the
prevention of human rights violations in the country, in line with its mandate.59 In
the introductory remarks written for the English language version of the report,
Zalaquett repeated the two ultimate objectives of a ‘justice in transition’ policy from
his 1990 article, with preventing the repetition of atrocities being one of them. In
Zalaquett’s words, the Commission’s mission was to decide how such an objective
could be achieved. The prevention recommendations stress the ‘significant flaws and
shortcomings’ of the domestic legal system which disable it to effectively protect
human rights.60 To that end, the Commission recommended a series of measures of
institutional and legal reform: aligning Chile’s legal framework with international
human rights law, reforming the judicial branch (including legal training), ensuring
that the armed forces, security forces and police exercise their functions in complete
accordance with the obligation to respect human rights, creating an institution to
protect human rights and making changes in the legal order in constitutional, crim-
inal and procedural matters to better protect human rights. These elaborate measures
are an extension to the 1990 article by Zalaquett, although ideologically identical.
These recommendations quickly became a trend. In the years to follow, truth
commissions generally adhered to non-recurrence as an objective of transitional just-
ice mechanisms in their recommendations. In the Guatemalan peace process, for in-
stance, avoiding repetition of violent events was connected to the right to truth,
manifested in the establishment and work of the Clarification Commission.61
Furthermore, in its final report, the truth commission in El Salvador recommended
measures of institutional reform to prevent the repetition of violent acts, broadly cat-
egorizing them as relating to justice, protection of human rights and reconstruction
of the national civil police.62
58 Ibid., 635.
59 Center for Civil and Human Rights, Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).
60 Ibid., 1075.
61 ‘Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
Between the Government of Guatemala and URNG,’ UN Doc. A/51/766 (12 December 1996), article
18.
62 The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, ‘From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El
Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador’ (The Commission on the Truth for El
Salvador, 1993).
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Zalaquett’s interpretation of these various measures of institutional and legal re-
form as measures best preventing human rights violations, and the subsequent practi-
ces of justice in transition, helped give content to the otherwise content-ambiguous
norm of non-recurrence in IHRL. An important yet insufficient argument would
point to the stark textual resemblances between the measures recommended by the
Chilean commission and those included in the Basic Principles, albeit stripped of
context.63 More notably, both the Chilean Commission and Zalaquett himself were
cited in van Boven’s appendix to the 1993 draft Basic Principles.64 Nearly three deca-
des later, Prof van Boven observed that the ‘certainly large’ influence of the Latin
American experience is manifested not only in the Basic Principles but in its contem-
porary, the Joinet/Orentlicher principles on impunity.65 In her 2005 report, Dianne
Orentlicher notes that ‘[s]ome aspects of’ listed GNRs are ‘characteristic of periods
of restoration or transition to democracy and/or peace that prevailed in Latin
America and other regions at the time the Principles were drafted,’ of which Chile
was a representative state.66 Supporting this is the pivotal role Chile played in the
creation of the Basic Principles, as the drafting consultations were chaired by Chilean
ambassador Alejandro Salinas.67 Finally, the overall political backing for these princi-
ples came from Latin American countries emerging from oppressive regimes.68 It is
here where I make the first and core claim of the early TJ developments’ influence
on the norm of non-recurrence in IHRL.
Until the Basic Principles were issued, however, the understandings of measures
most adequate for ensuring ‘Never Again’ in TJ were not explicitly phrased as ‘guar-
antees of non-recurrence’ but rather as prevention of repetition. Expectedly, a survey
of English-language newspaper articles published in the 1980s and 1990s I conducted
resulted in notable references to GNRs only regarding solving interstate disputes.
The language of GNRs was repeatedly used in the Afghan crisis on behalf of the
Afghan government to, for instance, seek appropriate political guarantees from the
Soviet Union against military invasions and other internal affairs interferences. In the
following decade, GNRs seldom made appearances in state officials’ statements
regarding conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon and generally maintained a rather low
profile.
In the early 2000s GNRs experience two distinct ‘booms’ in references – one in
discussions about state responsibility in connection to the LaGrand judgment and
the ARSIWA, and the other in relation to the developments of the early TJ
63 By way of example, the Chilean TRC recommends creating ‘a judicial branch that really plays its role of
guaranteeing the essential rights of persons,’ while the Basic Principles, faithful to van Boven’s 1993 prin-
ciples, in Article 23 (c) recommend ‘strengthening the independence of the judiciary.’
64 Theo van Boven, ‘Appendix C: Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-
Commission Has Been Concerned,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/8 (2 July 1993).
65 Personal interview, Prof Theo van Boven, by telephone, 6 October 2020. Prof van Boven was interviewed
for the purposes of the author’s doctoral thesis.
66 Orentlicher, supra n 40 at para 64.
67 See ‘Report of the Consultative Meeting on the Draft Basic Principles,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63
(2002).
68 Kelly McCracken, ‘Commentary on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law,’ Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 76 (2005): 77–79.
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scholarship and the Basic Principles. In the former, GNRs were discussed as
reviewed above, more as a debate about state obligation than about norm content.
On the latter front, GNRs become attached to, for example, history education about
the stolen children in Australia in an article Durbach and Kirk wrote for the
Australian on 14 August 2000, and restitution for the crimes committed against
‘comfort women’ in Japan, as demonstrated in a contribution to CNN by Shinsho
and Kamimura on 12 December 2000. Yet as the drafting of the Basic Principles con-
cluded in 2005, first references to the Principles and GNRs as legal and institutional
measures of reparation were made in Sierra Leone concerning the establishment of
the Special War Crimes Court,69 in Nigeria regarding widespread forced evictions70
and in a handful of other cases of human rights abuses in India, Algeria and the US.
In all these cases, GNRs and the other four types of reparations, as per the Basic
Principles, were called upon by Amnesty International, Zalaquett’s former employer.
Present-day references to the five distinct types of reparations, GNRs being one of
them, or to GNRs in isolation, are too numerous to list.
The key aspects of norm transformation in and by TJ in this stage are twofold.
Firstly, GNRs were given content and context expansion based on early TJ practices
and scholarship from Latin America. Secondly, the ‘Never Again’ promise, insepar-
able from justice in transition, was increasingly becoming equated with a list of insti-
tutional and legal reform measures, those that originally stemmed from Chile. Both
aspects of transformation were contingent on the growth of TJ as a legalized field,
blending in the post-Cold War politics of regime change and the overwhelming em-
phasis on good governance and the rule of law. In the formulation of TJ and the rule
of law as ‘mutually reinforcing phenomena,’71 institutional reform measures appear
crucial for restarting the rule of law in the transitioning society. This is because the
legitimacy of this revived rule of law depends both on the content of laws and the
process of making them, which necessitated reformative processes such as vetting.72
This stage of norm transformation therefore demonstrates transfers of local-level ad-
vocacy to the international arena and subsequent decontextualization of the norm
content from Chile/Latin American-specific contexts to a staple of universally applic-
able reparations.
T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S A N D F U R T H E R N O R M A T I V E E X P A N S I O N S
Equating the initial ideas about future-oriented actions aimed at fulfilling the ‘Never
Again’ promise to GNRs has been fortified through to work of the United Nations
(UN) and its intervention in TJ. Since 2004, transitional justice has been high on the
UN’s agenda. In the first major TJ report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote that
it was the horrendous events of the 1990s that showed that there can be no
69 The Analyst, ‘Liberia, The Sierra Leone Victims’ Confab is Crucial,’ All Africa, 1 March 2005.
70 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria; Making the Destitute Homeless – Forced Evictions in Makoko, Lagos
State,’ All Africa, 24 January 2006.
71 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or Awkward
Bedfellows?’ Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2 (2010): 127–154.
72 Pablo de Greiff, Transitional Justice, Security and Development: Security and Justice Thematic Paper
(Washington: World Bank, 2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9245 (accessed
2 June 2021).
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immediate nor long-term peace without appropriate redress for grievances and fair
administration of justice.73 Transitional justice was thereby becoming a norm. In
2010, the Secretary-General published a guidance note on TJ in which the duty of
prevention, from which GNRs stem, was discussed.74 Importantly, the report high-
lights that TJ processes should ‘ensure the right of victims to reparations, the right of
victims and societies to know the truth about violations, and guarantees of non-re-
currence of violations, in accordance with international law.’75 As to the content of
GNRs, this guidance note aligned with the measures listed in the Basic Principles.
The UN agenda on TJ, of course, culminated with the establishment of a Special
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
repetition by the Human Rights Council in 2011.76 The Special Rapporteur is widely
regarded as the ‘transitional justice’ rapporteur and truth, justice, reparations and
guarantees of non-repetition as the four pillars of the field. Without any explanations,
guarantees of non-repetition – and not, for instance, prevention – have been, firstly,
made a pillar of transitional justice, and not an objective, and secondly, separated
from reparations, contrary to the Basic Principles.
The Special Rapporteur was given a lengthy set of tasks, including recommending
how the elements of the mandate, such as GNRs, can be improved and strengthened,
and building their normative framework, which the first Special Rapporteur Pablo de
Greiff did in three separate reports. In the first and most elaborate report, De Greiff
provides clarifications to certain conceptual ambiguities regarding GNRs.77 He
defines a guarantee of non-repetition as a function performed through a variety of
measures, to which previously victimized societies as a whole are entitled, and where
state institutions are duty bearers. In that sense, guaranteeing non-repetition is no
longer a moral promise but ‘an object of rational policymaking.’78 The GNRs in TJ,
unlike in PIL, are not exceptional but normative; always specific and not general
guarantees, concrete interventions that oblige institutions of the state and jointly
contribute to diminishing the likelihood of repeated violence.79 As the legal founda-
tions for GNRs, the report relied on the developments of GNRs in IHRL, including
the work of the Human Rights Committee and regional human rights courts.
Therefore, the context in which these kinds of GNRs become applicable is in line
with the Basic Principles – gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
The norm transformation undertaken by the Special Rapporteur in this report is
not one of context but of content. In De Greiff’s theorization, GNRs incorporate
multiple measures that are feasible and could be achieved through TJ measures
which require overarching mobilization and benefit the entire previously victimized
73 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict
Societies,’ UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004).
74 United Nations Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to
Transitional Justice (New York: United Nations, 2010).
75 Ibid., 4.
76 Human Rights Council, ‘Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/18/L.22 (26 September 2011).
77 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of
Non-Recurrence,’ supra n 12.
78 Ibid., para 22.
79 Ibid., para 25.
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society. In his view, once the basic preconditions for institutional interventions such
as ensuring security and access to legal identity for all are met, there exist three fields
of intervention through which policies relating to GNRs should be structured.80 The
first one is the known level of official state institutions, inclusive of legal, judicial and
constitutional reforms, while the next two are the level of civil society and of cultural
and personal dispositions that, inter alia, includes educational reform and trauma
counselling. For each of the interventions, a series of measures were proposed, some
of which had never appeared in any documents or notable scholarly writings on
GNRs before.
The Special Rapporteur’s report on GNRs resonates with the initial understandings
of preventing future violations shown in Zalaquett’s writings and the Chilean context.
While the Chilean TRC emphasized that measures of legal and institutional reform do
not suffice to ensure non-repetition and asserted that human rights must be included in
formal education and manifested through symbolic measures and the attainment of truth
and justice, these recommendations were not replicated in the Basic Principles. They
were also not fully included in the early TJ scholarship which preoccupied itself with
state structures and laws. Like the TRC, the Special Rapporteur discusses education and
the changing of the culture of human rights as conditions needed to prevent future atroc-
ities. A complex function such as non-recurrence, the work of the Special Rapporteur
similarly posits, could not be limited to measures of legal and institutional reform.
Although this expands beyond IHRL, it should not be seen as problematic but as a doc-
trinal attempt to capture the complexities of the non-repetition of mass violence.
In his second report on GNRs, De Greiff discusses security sector reforms, in par-
ticular vetting and its contributions to non-recurrence.81 He believes that vetting can
be an enabling condition for transitional justice, meaning that TJ institutions will
work better if the institutions responsible for abuses are vetted. Finally, in the 2017
examination of regional approaches and advances to GNRs, De Greiff admits that
GNRs are rarely used outside UN circles and that even within the organization few
documents utilize the term.82 De Greiff is right in saying that only if we forget about
the GNRs which are operational in PIL. His criticism is that transitional justice has
not been especially good at taking advantage of this new knowledge of the norm,
which is why GNRs remain its least developed aspect.
De Greiff’s successor, Fabian Salvioli, has also addressed GNRs in his reports,
mainly reiterating De Greiff’s writings yet manifesting some conceptual confusion.83
In a report on domestic reparations, Salvioli argues that the right to reparation is im-
portant as a GNR but also references the IACtHR case law which lists GNRs as a
form of reparation.84 Such references could imply reparative as well as future-
80 Ibid.
81 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of
Non-Recurrence,’ UN Doc. A/70/438 (21 October 2015).
82 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of
Non-Recurrence on His Global Study on Transitional Justice,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/36/50/Add.1 (7
August 2017).
83 Ibid.
84 ‘. . . as it helps perpetrators to understand that what they did was wrong and that societies must undertake
to dignify the victims.’ ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation
and Guarantee of Non-recurrence,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/42/45 (11 July 2019) para 29.
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oriented characteristics of the concept in TJ. In yet another joint study, it was reiter-
ated that GNRs are doctrinally the least developed pillar, but that a ‘vast amount of
knowledge and expertise on the topic, albeit fragmented,’ exist, citing the three
reports on GNRs by De Greiff reviewed above which, as explained, are not firmly
empirically grounded.85 Nonetheless, such phrasing signifies, in my view, that these
three interventions on GNRs by the Special Rapporteur have become ‘the know-
ledge’ about GNRs in transitional justice. Such knowledge is thus far the final and
most expansive transformation of the norm of non-recurrence.
This new ‘knowledge’ is of course in tension with the previously detected
attempts to equate GNRs with broadly defined measures of legal and institutional re-
form. A brief review of selected international TJ advocacy provides insights into
whether and how this further normative expansion of the norm of non-recurrence
has been implemented in practice. Looking at Amnesty International, for instance,
the number of references to GNRs increases dramatically post 2011, yet these typic-
ally introduce GNRs as an aspect of ‘full reparation’ or an element of comprehensive
TJ.86 In the case of Sri Lanka, towards which much of Amnesty’s TJ advocacy has
been directed in the past decade, the language of GNRs as something drastically dif-
ferent or expanding beyond legal and institutional reform is not noted. In recom-
mending the necessary GNRs for the Sri Lankan government to undertake, the
organization cites the Basic Principles 19–2387 or otherwise elaborates on more con-
text-specific legal and institutional measures such as witness and victim protection or
an enforced disappearances act.88
At the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), although there is
evidence of the Special Rapporteur’s normative expansion taking root, some
level of conceptual ambiguity is maintained. The information available on the
organization’s website indicates that GNRs are not a standalone category of re-
search and practice, but it is rather ‘institutional reform’ that appears as ‘the
fourth pillar’ of TJ, next to truth and memory, criminal justice and reparations.
A further review of the ICTJ’s publications leads to a conclusion that while the
language of preventing repetition is often inseparable from recommended or
applied measures of institutional reform, certain practices conceptualize GNRs
as beyond institutional reform.89 In a recent report published by the Working
Group on TJ and SDG16+, which is convened by the ICTJ but also includes
organizations such as Impunity Watch and Swisspeace, it is De Greiff’s concep-
tualization of GNRs that was advocated for. One of the recommendations
issued was to ‘[e]xpand the understanding of means to achieve guarantees
of nonrecurrence to include . . . civil society, faith-based, cultural, and
85 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of
Non-recurrence and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide,’ UN
Doc. A/HRC/37/65 (6 June 2018).
86 For example, Amnesty International, Tunisia: When Bones Speak. The Struggle to Bring Faysal Baraket’s
Torturers to Justice (October 2013).
87 Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Making the Right Choices (November 2016).
88 Amnesty International, Flickering Hope: Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence in Sri
Lanka (January 2019).
89 See, for example, Roger Duthie, Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured
Societies (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017).






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab011/6304982 by guest on 23 August 2021
individual-level interventions.’90 The Center also runs an annual course on pre-
vention and GNRs and the role of TJ in Barcelona which has accommodated
some of the noted conceptual expansion and confusion over the years. For in-
stance, in 2019, the overview of the course on the ICTJ’s website acknowledged
that GNRs are ‘defined beyond the institutional sphere,’ while in 2020, GNRs
emerged as ‘under-explored’ and how TJ prevents recurrence of violence is ‘less
clear, and more contested.’ Nevertheless, the course still promises to explore TJ
practices and their contributions to avoiding the recurrence of violence across
numerous case studies. Overwhelmingly, the ICTJ’s treatment of GNRs reads
as strategically malleable enough, both universally applicable and ambiguous, to
be adjusted to any new contexts and situations that may arise.91
R E V O L U T I O N O R C O N F U S I O N ?
I have argued that transitional justice practice and scholarship have aided the trans-
formation of the content and context of GNRs in international law but that more re-
cently GNRs have been distinguished as qualitatively different in TJ as opposed to
IHRL. GNRs in TJ are a prime example of what Christine Bell has usefully framed as
‘the new law’ of TJ in her analysis of TJ’s mingling with international legal norms on
accountability and the process of regime merge.92 Throughout the article, I evidenced
how illustrative GNRs are of this regime merge or, perhaps more adequately phrased,
regime blur. As Bell concludes, the developments stemming from the regime merge
can be read as either positive or negative; they can be welcomed for their normative
flexibility or considered dangerous for ‘exceptional application of international law.’93
The story of the norm of non-recurrence and its relationship with TJ is too unex-
plored in practice to be proclaimed as either outright positive or negative. What this
article brings to the forefront is a tension between normative revolutions and confu-
sions triggered by TJ which can and will have significant effects on local TJ practices
relating to ‘Never Again.’ In the preceding sections, I have identified the decontext-
ualization of the norm content from Chile and Latin America and its transfer to uni-
versal applicability. In this process of decontextualization, the ‘Never Again’ promise
was equated to the international legal norm of GNRs and GNRs, as a pillar of TJ, to
institutional reform. It is possible that due to the widespread application of TJ as a
project,94 this equation is prevalent in domestic policymaking. As Arthur asserts, the
norm entrepreneurship in transitional justice has involved attempts to produce a
body of knowledge about causal relationships between justice measures and transi-
tions, in all their diversity,95 a trend that is characteristic for policy-oriented thinking.
90 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘On Solid Ground. Building Sustainable Peace and
Development After Massive Human Rights Violations. Report of the Working Group on Transitional
Justice and SDG16+’ (May 2019), 2.
91 See Jamie Rowen, Searching for the Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
92 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
93 Ibid., 256.
94 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections,’ Third World Quarterly 29
(2008): 275–289.
95 Arthur, supra n 63.
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The worry is that the technocratic current in TJ has already established a causal rela-
tionship between ‘Never Again’ and institutional reform across contexts, which are
much different from those in which this equation was initially made. In addition to
Amnesty International’s treatment of GNRs, a further illustration would be the 2015
European Union’s Policy Framework on support to TJ which lists the fourth pillar of
TJ as ‘guarantees of non-recurrence/institutional reform’ thereby making the two
equal and inseparable.96
The danger of ‘institutional fixes,’ of tying legal and institutional measures to the
value of preventing renewed violence, as these two examples suggest is in that they
could limit further productive thinking about ‘Never Again.’97 The norm transfer and
transformation could have therein normatively limited GNRs in TJ projects (as
opposed to TJ practice at large), omitting measures that could prove more effective
in the maintenance of lasting peace, or excluding responsibility-bearing actors other
than the state. If this equation implies that there is a causal relationship between in-
stitutional reform and non-recurrence and that non-recurrence can hence be meas-
ured through the application of institutional reform measures, then the utility of the
norm of non-recurrence across contexts ought to be questioned. Would its utility be
more enhanced with its original characteristics found in the PIL regime, where the
norm is flexible, exceptional and even ambiguous, than when it is colonized by a
broad category of institutional reform? What is certain, nevertheless, is that the
understanding that guaranteeing non-recurrence is the right of individuals and not
only states is a transformation indebted to the birth and development of transitional
justice. Based on this spread of the sense of both non-exceptional state obligation
and individual right to non-recurrence in postconflict contexts, transitional justice
has aided a significant norm transformation, one might even say a revolution.
On the opposite end is the possibility that the ongoing conceptual expansion by
the UN and strategic maintenance of norm malleability, as evidenced by the ICTJ’s
course on prevention and GNRs, allow for the flexible characteristics of GNRs to
persist to the extent that selective implementation of the norm is accommodated.
Making GNRs qualitatively different in TJ than in IHRL opens space for recontextu-
alization of the seemingly universally applicable equation of GNRs to institutional re-
form. A good example of this is the 2016 Final Agreement between the Colombian
government and the FARC.98 The agreement uses the term ‘guarantees of non-repe-
tition’ dozens of times and embodies the principle of non-repetition throughout the
proposed TJ intervention, therein prescribing numerous measures that need to be
established to reach the objective of non-recurrence. These various measures are in-
clusive of rural reform, accountability and political participation, and victim-oriented
measures such as truth recovery, national collective reparations and even strengthen-
ing the mechanisms for human rights education. The current prospects for
96 Council of the European Union, ‘EU’s Support to Transitional Justice – Council Conclusions,’ EU Doc.
13576/15 (16 November 2015).
97 Richard W. Miller, ‘Global Institutional Reform and Global Social Movements: From False Promise to
Realistic Hope,’ Cornell International Law Journal 39 (2006): 501–502.
98 ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Republic
of Colombia and the FARC-EP,’ 24 November 2016, available in Peace Agreements Database peaceagree-
ments.org (accessed 4 August 2020).
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materializing these measures aside, the agreement demonstrates a context-based ap-
proach to GNRs conceptualization, promoting non-recurrence as overall implemen-
tation of all provisions in the agreement. What is missing from this comprehensive
agreement, however, are measures of institutional reform such as security sector re-
form and vetting that would otherwise likely be triggered in IHRL. The Colombian
peace agreement, one could argue, is thus a curious case of either welcome context
sensitivity emerging out of political negotiation, or random selectivity of measures
phrased as GNRs in the absence of clear guidance on specific GNRs stemming from
the principles of state responsibility.
Expanding the conceptual realm of GNRs presumably leaves more room for con-
text specificity; yet detachment from international law, as seen in the Colombian case,
also creates more opportunities for non-applicability and non-application, to the disad-
vantage of prospective beneficiaries. The confusion regarding GNRs is thus not only
normative and conceptual but also concerning legal obligations and their practical de-
livery at home. The flexibility of the norm, while characteristic of GNRs in internation-
al law, is contrary to the non-exceptional nature of ‘Never Again’ in TJ. Both the
normative expansion and maintenance of openness in TJ have made GNRs more ne-
cessary than international law proposed they should be, to the point where they are
universally needed and applicable. Hence the usefulness of the concept is that in any
peace processes incorporating TJ, like in Colombia, there is a sense of necessity to use
the language of GNRs to demonstrate a sense of duty to indeed ensure non-repetition
of mass violence through specific actions. Yet, this seemingly welcome marker of con-
text specificity is also inseparable from the malleable character of TJ itself99 and there-
fore the emergence of GNRs as purposefully mandatory yet still conceptually
ambiguous. The continuous normative expansion and openness keep the norm-affirm-
ing potential of GNRs weak and could plausibly enable ‘Never Again’ to become what-
ever is easiest, and not whatever is most necessary to implement. To put it bluntly, it
would mean drawing from not multiple but no legal regimes whatsoever and leading
the ‘too ambitious, too quickly’ approach to norm transformation to result in inaction.
If this were the case, it would mean that the ‘new law’ of TJ is more concerned with
making the ‘Never Again’ promise than with fulfilling it, and as such embodies a pillar of
mere verbal assurances rather than meaningful and revolutionary GNRs. A step forward
should not be to entirely reinvent GNRs in TJ; it is a slippery but highly phenomenal
concept TJ has brought into IHRL. Instead, application of GNRs should mean allowing
the lived experiences of beneficiaries to be reflected in the norm content, which making
GNRs normatively distinct in TJ could do to some extent, while still tying the concept
to its legal origins and the principles of state responsibility to guarantee non-recurrence
in IHRL to ensure that any political abuse of the obligation is minimized.
C O N C L U S I O N
In this article I have shown how transitional justice has transformed both the con-
tents and contexts of the principle of non-recurrence and has furthermore helped
stretch the principle of state responsibility in the human rights regime. Until the
emergence of TJ as a distinct field and the subsequent developments in IHRL with
99 See Rowen, supra n 91.
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regards to victims’ rights, assurances and GNRs suffered from non-uniform state
practice and were known for their exceptional character. Invoking the principle of
non-recurrence most frequently meant a mere verbal commitment, an apology and a
promise not to act in a violating way again. However, the contexts of transitional just-
ice bring mass violations into the picture, violations perpetrated by state agents to-
wards their citizens and enabled through various state structures, including laws and
institutions. The influence of the developments in Chile and other Latin American
countries on the Basic Principles and the establishment of GNRs as a form of repar-
ation which such violating states could be entitled to provide is, without a doubt, a
welcome and most remarkable development. Still, I have also provided empirical
examples that further complicate the conundrum about non-recurrence in TJ, dem-
onstrating that the norm of non-recurrence has been both equated to institutional re-
form measures and simultaneously normatively expanded and maintained as
sufficiently ambiguous to be applicable and necessary across varying contexts. The
story of GNRs is therefore one of decontextualization of local understandings of the
norm and further attempts to recontextualize the same norm in light of or despite
the content given by TJ. The effects of these processes on both actual non-recur-
rence and perceptions of it in local contexts, if any, will have to be studied empirical-
ly while building on the legal and conceptual foundations and tensions established in
this article.
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